

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

HUNGARIAN NATO MEMBERSHIP AFTER 11 SEPTEMBER 2001

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The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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ABSTRACT

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The strategic status of Hungary has significantly changed in recent years, partly due to the events of September 2001, and partly because seven more countries - including three of Hungary's neighbors - were invited to join NATO in 2002. The Prague Capability Commitments also add a significant new factor, as Hungary committed to a four-year development program.

Upon joining NATO, Hungary had to face the fact that defense expectations accepted a few years earlier and functioning properly under certain conditions, were in contradiction with reality and did not offer correct answers to emerging security and defense questions. The same situation has now reappeared. Under such circumstances, Hungary's vital interest is to react to the changes of the international environment, and consider them in the transformation of its military force.

This study examines the impacts of a changed international situation and NATO concepts for Hungarian NATO membership. This paper will address how Hungary can meet the requirements of a new era, and develop an efficient military force that fulfills the tasks of traditional territorial defense as well as respond to the security challenges of the 21st century.

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HUNGARIAN NATO MEMBERSHIP AFTER 11 SEPTEMBER 2001

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 have had an even greater impact on Alliance strategic thinking than the Srebrenica massacre.¹ A day after hijackers flew commercial airliners into the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, the Allies responded by invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time in the Alliance's history.² By agreeing that a terrorist attack by a non-state actor should trigger the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO) collective self-defense obligation, the Alliance had, in effect, mandated itself to make combating terrorism an enduring NATO mission.

In the past decade the world has witnessed the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union itself, unification of the two Germanys, and the subsequent issues of enlarging both the European Union (EU) and NATO. The current European security structure that has emerged is based around these two organizations. The EU is committed to a process of eastern and southern enlargement, which will double its present membership over the next ten to fifteen years.³ The further enlargement of NATO is also on the European and transatlantic agenda.⁴ NATO's great challenge at the opening of the twenty-first century is to expand through enlargement that zone of confidence, security, and stability to Europe's eastern half. The extension of these multilateral institutions will define the political, security and economic framework of Europe for the next generation and more.

After the resolution of the Kosovo conflict, the near complete elimination of the threat of a major military conflict in the region, and the successful NATO and EU campaign in Macedonia, Hungarian security is primarily threatened by collateral phenomena such as terrorism, the potential influx of political and economic refugees, illegal gun trafficking and the development of transnational organized crime (new types of threats).

For Hungary, Euro-Atlantic integration and accession since 1990, as well as membership in international organizations has had two dimensions. The first is the dimension of values.⁵ The second is the dimension of institutions. Hungary's attitude toward the former has not changed. Hungarians continue to believe in the same values, and want to be part of the European and the trans-Atlantic community. Hungary would like to be part of it because the nation feels at home there. But concerning the latter, Hungary has to note the change that has taken place in the institutions themselves. Today the general feeling of Hungarians is that integration has already taken place. But by the time the integration process was completed, the whole world had

changed. And, as part of this major change, the very institutions Hungary wanted to join changed as well.

The world, including the security environment and the role of armed forces, has changed fundamentally.⁶ In the 21st century, land forces that are solely equipped for territorial defense cannot overcome a mostly invisible enemy that attacks from the air from a distance of hundreds of kilometers or explodes bombs in the heart of a city, even if they have significant artillery reserves, numerous armored vehicles and anti-armor capabilities. It is in this context that one must address the fundamentals of military reform in Hungary.

For more than a decade, Hungarian governments have been grappling with the immense task of transforming an oversized mass army into a streamlined, but much more effective modern one. In spite of this fact, and because of the imbalance and increasing overhead costs, Hungary failed to deliver the required military capabilities, and lost her credibility. The current government has, however, taken seriously its promise to begin to build an efficient military force that fulfils the tasks of traditional territorial defense, as well as respond to the security challenges of the 21st century. This meant considering defense issues in a new light as a result of a comprehensive defense review that lasted nearly a year.

THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND CHANGING HUNGARY'S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

12 March 1999 is a remarkable date in the history of Hungary, when the Nation became a full-fledged member-state of NATO. On the basis of the individual decision made by the Hungarian citizens Hungary came back to the community to whom she had always belonged according to her history, culture and traditions.

Hungary and the two other, Central European allies stood shoulder-to-shoulder with the old allies in their determination to invoke Article 5 provisions⁷ for the United States after the catastrophic terrorist attacks on New York and Washington.⁸ Besides fully complying with Washington's requests in an allied manner, Hungary followed up this declaration of solidarity with a decision to quickly contribute international humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan and offered a medical team for the Alliance's purposes.

The tragic events in New York and Washington have created new risks and challenges to global security. Terrorism has become the major concern of the international community. The tragic events will have a wide-ranging long-term impact both on the perception of security and the means whereby it can be provided. In the field of prevention and crisis management there is an absolute need for change.

The challenges and risks NATO is facing today can be tackled effectively only by an Alliance which is bigger and stronger than ever before.⁹ There can be no doubt that NATO needs an appropriate security structure to meet the requirements of the 21st century. Both challenges – war on terror, new capabilities and enlargement – are profound for NATO and must be solved. They will influence NATO's future and the perspectives of European Security.¹⁰

On the political side, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) has decided that NATO should be ready to help deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorist attacks directed from abroad, as and where required.¹¹ It should be ready to help national authorities cope with the aftermath of attacks; moreover, on a case-by-case basis, the Alliance should consider providing its assets and capabilities to support operations, including those against terrorism, undertaken by or in cooperation with EU or other international organizations or coalitions involving Allies. The authorization of Article 5 by NATO after the attacks in September 2001 was a conventional response to an unconventional challenge, but the meeting of the NAC made a conceptual breakthrough by accepting that NATO will go beyond its borders to defend its members' interests.¹² On the military side, NATO now has a military concept for defense against terrorism for which the Alliance's military authorities are now developing a concept of operations to put into effect. The new concept sets out four categories of possible military activity by NATO. These are anti-terrorism; consequence management; counter-terrorism; and military cooperation.¹³

As a result, The Prague Summit¹⁴ in November 2002 approved the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), a new program to reform NATO's defense capabilities. The core of this program is that NATO would focus on the development of fewer, but realistic and applicable capabilities.

NATO's new capabilities initiative, the PCC, is designed to improve, among other things, the Alliance's terrorism-related capabilities and ensure that European militaries are equipped to respond more rapidly, apply military force more effectively and sustain themselves in combat.¹⁵

Deployability and mobility have become key areas due to the rapid response capabilities needed for conflict prevention.¹⁶ Under the current circumstances, the method of mobilizing civilian equipment is no longer applicable, primarily because mobilization time is too long and does not allow for crisis prevention. The importance of efficient weaponry and equipment has been demonstrated by direct war experience. Perhaps one of the key conclusions from Kosovo was that the new types of missions undertaken by the Alliance require that NATO troops have appropriate and sufficient combat capabilities for the full spectrum of military applications.¹⁷

In Prague, NATO leaders invited seven countries – three of Hungary's neighbors – to begin membership-accession negotiations, adopted a series of measures to improve military capabilities, and endorsed a package of initiatives to forge new relationships with Partners. The enlargement of NATO is, a fundamental challenge facing the Alliance.

The European security environment has significantly changed since the late 1980s. These changes have accelerated since the collapse of the bipolar system in the early 1990s. The opposition of superpowers, which characterized, the almost fifty years following 1945, disappeared and has gradually been replaced by cooperation. The threat that constituted the primary reason for NATO's existence began to decrease, and the 1990s showed that the member states did not have to expect a major strategic attack. However, new sources of conflict have also emerged and some existing crises have intensified and become more destructive.

Hungary could be threatened by traditional terrorist attacks as well as the application of methods and means applied by terrorist organizations, which now may include the capability and potential to use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. The current and potential sources of tension and crisis areas - primarily Southeastern Europe and Eastern Europe, and secondly the Caucasus and Central Asia - still undoubtedly continue to influence the country's security, but they do not pose a traditional symmetric threat.

From the time of democratic changes in Hungary, her role and aim have remained the same: by contributing actively to the stability of Central Europe, Hungary helps foster a sustainable, European wide peace and prosperity. Hungary cooperates closely with her neighbors, sharing her recent experiences in building a society based on democratic values and functioning market economy. Hungary is interested in extending the zone of stability, and the best road leading to this goal is through helping its neighbors in their endeavor to introduce the same values in their societies. All her neighbors have become part of the Euro-Atlantic integration or expressed their intention to integrate; therefore Hungary's bilateral relations are dominated by cooperation in spite of the inevitable difference of views.

Hungarian ethnic minorities in neighboring countries are also active in helping to enhance stability in the region. They formed democratic parties and developed constitutional and legal ways to promote democracy in their respective countries. In the past ten years, Hungarian ethnic minorities have demonstrated that they are not part of the problem, but much more an instrument for the solution leading to full and operational democracy. Hungary has developed partnerships with the neighboring countries – three of Hungary's neighbors were invited to join NATO¹⁸ – that render military threats highly unlikely.

Hungary has close historical ties with its neighbors in the Balkans as well. There is also a special link - the Hungarian minorities living across the border. The democratic changes in these countries have opened a new chapter in cooperation. Hungary's relations with Slovenia and Croatia are very close and mutually beneficial. After the fall of the post-communist Milosevic regime Hungary has returned to normal relations with the former Yugoslavia.

At the same time, Hungary maintains the best possible relations with Ukraine and Russia, who have a special partnership with NATO. It is the common aim of all countries in Europe and in the Euro-Atlantic area to promote stability and security and face new challenges such as international terrorism. Hungary will try to contribute its fair share to this common endeavor.

Russia, the sole power having large-scale land forces in NATO's immediate surroundings, had become a partner by the end of the decade with whom the members of the alliance were able to cooperate in several peacekeeping missions and with whom institutional relations were established through the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). The NATO-Russia relationship is very critical to European stability.¹⁹ Ukraine could play an important role as a bridge or mediator between NATO and Russia to improve relations. A stable, flourishing and Western-oriented Ukraine would contribute not only to the internal development of the country but also to the stability of the Central and Eastern European region including Hungary.

Hungary's security status is primarily determined by its membership in NATO. Hungary's accession to the European Union this year will also have a significantly positive impact on the country's security status, and the economic and political opportunities are expected to grow.

The before mentioned facts make it unlikely that the Republic of Hungary could be threatened by aggression with conventional military means in the next decade. At present, the new types of threats pose a much more likely risk to Hungary than a traditional attack. The defense strategies of NATO and the EU have both significantly shifted from territorial defense towards expeditionary missions. At present, this concept can be undoubtedly considered as the two organizations' most important response to the new security environment. Hungary's vital interest is to react to the changes of the international environment, and consider them in the transformation of its military force.

TRANSFORMATION OF HUNGARIAN DEFENSE FORCES

The Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF) have changed significantly during the last fifteen years.²⁰ In the present security environment, the HDF has to face more and different threats and risks. Up-to-date forces do not try to meet these demands by raising the number of personnel, but by establishing a more flexible, capability-based structure instead.

When Hungary joined NATO most of the members, like Hungary herself, were not ready to handle new challenges.²¹ This was shown by the Kosovo war that broke out two weeks after Hungarian accession. Due to the lack of precision munitions capable of minimising collateral damage and because of the scarcity of deployable forces, two-thirds of the air operations and a disproportionately large share of the peacekeeping operations on land had to be executed by the United States.

Out of nearly two million soldiers of the European members of the Alliance, only a fragment can be deployed in a remote area. Hungary, also still has massive mechanized and tank units unable to cope with new challenges. Some of the member states have already made these difficult decisions, others have not, but all need to undergo change in order to establish up-to-date military capabilities.

Hungary traditionally has conscripted Defense Forces. Hungary has to concede that the age of enlisted armies has passed; the present military profession demands multi-faceted knowledge - mental agility and physical exertion which can only be achieved with voluntary soldiers.

Maintaining the present structure of HDF is impossible even by relying upon increasing financial sources, and it is also pointless. The expenses of maintaining the present structure would be so high that there would be no resource left to increase the military capabilities. Without a process for reform Hungary would either have to increase the defense budget to a great extent or the investments would not yield any added value.

THE DEFENSE REVIEW IN HUNGARY

The objective of the Defense Review (which had been carried out between August, 2002 and July 2003) was to redefine the function and tasks of the HDF in compliance with the significantly changed international situation and NATO concepts, and national interests and goals. The overall goal was to identify and prioritize the necessary capabilities and make proposals to allocate resources to such capabilities.²²

Main reasons for a review:

- After 11 September fighting against terrorism and asymmetric threats became the major challenges for the international community.
- In Prague seven countries have received invitation to join the Alliance. Three of them are Hungary's neighbors.
- As the security environment changed, the Alliance outlined new priorities. Those priorities had a great influence on Hungary's foreign, security and defense objectives,

from which the country derived new tasks, and new demand, for increased employability of her military capabilities.

- In the last couple of years Hungary has been losing her credibility in NATO.

In order to apply the best practices already successful within the Alliance, the review was carried out based on the methodology applied in 1997/98 by the United Kingdom. This ten-step procedure included different areas: setting objectives regarding foreign, security and defense policies, defining the goals and tasks of the defense force and the basic planning activities related to these (the necessary military force required by each task), defining the military capabilities required by the tasks together with all their consequences, and calculating the necessary resources needed to work out the various alternatives based on a system of priorities.

The ten-step process

1. Agree on foreign and security policy objectives (based on threat analysis).
2. Agree on defence objectives.
3. Agree on military missions and tasks.
4. Agree on planning assumptions.
5. Identify required military capabilities.
6. Identify the full implications.
7. Develop credible and robust costing.
8. Identify options.
9. Decide on priorities.
10. Allocation of resources and finalisation of master plan.

Some elements of the sequential steps could be implemented in parallel but it is important to follow the logic of the process and to resist any temptations to jump into premature decisions.

The function and tasks of the HDF

A military force that entirely meets the new requirements must be able to defend Hungary's sovereignty and territorial integrity within the framework of NATO, as well as provide a significant contribution to the common defense and allied operations. Besides its tasks defined in the Constitution and other legal provisions, it must also have the necessary capabilities to participate in the UN, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), EU missions and/or military operations conducted by other ad hoc coalitions.

The expectations and necessary capabilities:

- In the present time, Hungary needs flexible defense forces that can be used within the entire spectrum of national and allied tasks, from fighting a war to peace operations.
- It is essential that certain elements be used for various tasks, to ensure maximum flexibility and reduce costs.²³
- Combat support and combat service support capabilities should be pre-requisites for the deployment of combat forces.²⁴
- In order to carry out properly the new tasks, Hungary needs light, mobile and deployable land forces that can be appropriately supported in operations and that can be maintained for a longer duration of time. There are several components of deployability and one of the most important forms is to provide some sort of strategic transportation capability.
- Hungary needs gradually to enter into service up-to-date military technical equipment to achieve a higher level of interoperability with other measures of the Alliance. The first and most important area and means of interoperability is an up-to-date, mobile and secure command, communications and information capability.
- Besides the necessary defense, in case of an operation within the country, according to Article V of the Washington Treaty, the HDF and supporting infrastructure have to be ready to provide Host Nation Support for the arriving allied forces.
- In the context of new challenges, the defense capabilities against weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and radiological weapons, become essential.
- Conclusions drawn from the previous wars proved the increasing importance of Special Forces, which are very efficient compared with their size and costs.
- In most allied countries the last decade has been characterized by a continuous decrease in the size of defense forces and, with the exception of the few largest member states, none of the defense forces managed to maintain the spectrum of capabilities typical of the Cold War. That is the reason behind the process of increasing specialization and multinational cooperation within NATO. Participation in this cooperation and the creation of the so called supplementary capabilities are essential for Hungary.
- The increasing demands for capabilities require the switch to professional defense forces. Present-day challenges require high-readiness forces, which can be deployed quickly.

- Forces on high alert need proper training, including regular exercises with allied forces. These forces must be fully manned, and the units participating as readiness units for NATO's Reaction Forces must be manned above 100 per cent.
- The defense forces must be capable of attracting, recruiting, employing and retaining soldiers in sufficient number and quality.

Modular-system defense force

NATO does not expect its smaller members to maintain a mass defense force with the full spectrum of capabilities, which can only be modernized and maintained at a high cost. The requirements of modern warfare and the division of tasks within the Alliance, as well as cost-effectiveness, allow Hungary to create a defense force that contributes modular elements to the common defense capabilities and is able to carry out its tasks efficiently both at home and abroad. It also means that its allies, if necessary, will provide certain modules, which are not included in Hungary's system. In terms of the combat land forces, this modular approach should provide infantry battalions, which are able to deploy separately, be self-sufficient for a month, and be subordinated under national or Allied brigade command. These battalions should include all combat support and supply sub-units that are needed to carry out their tasks.

The levels of deployability of the combat support units²⁵ in Hungary would consist of one battalion. Since there is no threat to the territorial integrity of Hungary, the same sub-units should provide support for the peacekeeping contingents abroad on a sub-battalion level.

In terms of the air force, the combat modular elements should consist of the combat air- and helicopter squadrons.²⁶ In terms of combat support, these modules should include short-range air defense missile platoons, and in terms of supply they should be transport helicopter squadrons. Like the land forces these modules can be reorganized according to the particular operation.

Peace operations - a basic task

The Defense Review redefined the mission of the HDF in this field as well: territorial defense is only one of the basic tasks together with the participation in peace operations abroad. The majority of the covenants Hungary made at the NATO summit in Prague are in accordance with her intention to increase the presence of the HDF in the international arena in the future.

The involvement of the HDF in peace operations is not a new phenomenon. Such tasks have already been increasingly carried out by the HDF in the past (Balkans, Cyprus, Sinai

Peninsula). Besides the missions already existing for years, since 2003 new missions have been established where Hungarian peacekeepers are present. Hungary joined the activity of the international peacemaking forces in Afghanistan and participated in the Iraqi peacekeeping operation.

Today, more than one thousand persons from the HDF take part in peace operations at fifteen locations, upon the request of eight organizations. 148 persons take part in the UN mission,²⁷ six in the OSCE mission,²⁸ 41 persons in the MFO²⁹ mission, two persons in the subordination of CENTCOM,³⁰ 15 persons in the ISAF³¹ mission, 300 persons in the ranks of SFIR,³² 557 persons in NATO-led missions, while three persons participate in the EU mission.³³ The Defense Review was targeted to utilize these capabilities, and develop new ones.

Modernization of the military technology

In order to establish defense forces in line with the requirements of the 21st century, it is absolutely vital to modernize the existing military technology that will be used in the future, and to procure new assets.³⁴

However, as a result of the review, an annually increasing amount of money should be spent on military technology.³⁵ The leadership of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) has designed the various procurement programs in order to meet the requirements of capability-based defense forces. One of the important objectives is to establish mobility. The Ministry developed a ten-year vehicle procurement program in 2002 with this purpose in mind.

Very important criteria for modern defense forces are up-to-date and secure communications. The Minister of Defense signed an agreement with the Norwegian Kongsberg Communications A.S. on March 11, 2003, to deliver equipment meeting the requirements of the Defense Forces. According to this agreement, Kongsberg will continuously deliver nearly ten thousand up-to-date radio sets representing a high level of technology and capable of guaranteeing secure communications for the Defense Forces.

On June 25, 1999, the NAC adopted a capability package for 3D radar equipment, and consequently a radar upgrade will be realized in Hungary by September 30, 2006, at a cost of Hungarian Forint (HUF) 23.5 billion, funded mostly from NATO resources.

The integration of the JAS-39 Gripen EBS HU combat aircraft is expected to become the biggest capability increase of the HDF. The Government signed the agreement, as a result of which the 14 up-to-date fighters will be able to perform both air-to-air, and air-to-ground tasks. The aircraft will be capable of air-to-air refueling from the same tanker as the Eurofighter or the French Mirage.

Mobile operations - territorial defense

There is no need for entrenched forces along the border - that would require twenty battalions for a hundred kilometers - instead, mobile helicopter units should be in a high state of readiness in order to react quickly to warnings coming from border guards, the police or military intelligence, and should remain ready to respond at the location of the intervention or armed aggression. Shortly after neutralizing any external threat, the unit should be able to carry out similar tasks at other distant locations along the border.

A similar maneuver technique should be typical of territorial defense. All combat and support units of the HDF should be characterized by a high level of mobility and substantial fire power. Mobile operations prevent the enemy from gathering current data about the forces. In case of a national defense operation, all units of the HDF can be ordered home.

Special Forces

As a result of the PCC and the Defense Review, the HDF is going to set up a special operational battalion. The battalion with a 400-strong table of establishment is to be based upon one of the reconnaissance battalions. Its preparation is to start with that of the 3rd company in the spring of this year.³⁶ According to plans, the end of 2005 will mark the preparation of the 3rd company, and the entire battalion will reach its combat readiness by 2007.

The special operational battalion will be prepared to fight non-conventional and anti-terrorist combat. The US Special Forces are to help in the preparation by providing logistical support as well as assistance in training and methodology. An officer and an NCO of the future unit have already received "green beret training" in the USA. In addition to being the best prepared HDF battalion in this field capable of being deployed anytime, the unit will also be prepared to conduct training by itself.³⁷ Insofar as the MPs in the Parliament accept the legal modification, the government in power could deploy the unit abroad in its own sphere of authority.³⁸

Specialization - Capabilities

While NATO has a surplus in combat troops, it lacks the necessary combat support and supply capabilities in nearly all planned or current operations. NATO aims to solve these problems by initiating voluntary specialization within the members.³⁹ Specialization means that a member state establishes and maintains certain military capabilities beyond its own needs to fulfill the necessities of the Alliance. In the case of Hungary, these entail the establishment of the capabilities of field water supply, bridge building and military police. In Hungary the priorities

were to offer capabilities that are really needed in the Alliance, that build upon existing knowledge or can be established quickly and at low cost.

The majority of the covenants Hungary made at the NATO summit in Prague are in accordance with the Hungarian intention to increase the presence of the HDF in the international arena in the future. Within the context of the PCC, Hungary offered to establish specialized capabilities, thus during the Defense Review it proposed the establishment of these capabilities. There is also a considerable increase in the number of mobile, deployable combat elements. All combat elements of the new land brigades, together with a part of the combat aircraft and helicopters of the Air Force and the necessary support elements may participate in such international missions.

Voluntary defense force

As a part of Hungary's efforts to establish a modern defense force and in accordance with the process of the Defense Review, a decision has been made to implement the voluntary defense force by 2006. Preparations have been made to achieve this goal. The realization of the review will lead to a certain change in the overall military philosophy. In the 21st century the focus is not on the size of the defense force or the amount of equipment (especially heavy equipment), it is on manpower. The soldier constitutes the most important element of a defense force. A focus on human beings, and personal achievement will be essential in the future. This includes the policy of properly training people for a particular task, the importance of the working and living environment, and the increase in social prestige.

With professionally trained personnel for national defense capabilities, the utilization of money spent on defense will also improve. The transition between 2004 and 2006 requires nearly HUF 60 billion. However, the operation and sustainment of the system will not require considerable extra expenses from the MoD, or from the national economy in the long run.

Manning, Resources, Legal aspects

The way to achieve the required, realistic and affordable military capabilities with all volunteer forces is to develop a modern defense planning system. Such a system is expected to produce a properly costed ten-year plan and maintain balance between requirements and available resources.⁴⁰

Manning the new structure is a complex task. Actual strength of the HDF is 42,000 (9,100 conscripts); the planned strength is 35,000 by 2006 and 30,000 by 2013. To reach the planned level, phase by phase, does not seem to be difficult, but it is. Hungary has to transfer many

people, adjust the ratio of officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel, while also retaining qualified personnel.

The HUF 300 billion sum spent this year must demonstrate transparency and effectiveness. The defense-budget is expected to grow from 1.61 to 1.81 percent of the GDP by 2006, and the sum of the assumed resources for ten years is 4.155 billion HUF.⁴¹

To balance the resource plan the HDF requested governmental assistance in handling infrastructure and equipment surplus. Finally, to meet Hungary's alliance obligations, the HDF makes every effort to amend the legal background in order to perform the new tasks.

VITAL NATURE OF CHANGE

In order to meet the statements of the Defense Review and the requirements of a new era, Hungary must not solely develop an efficient military force. The "ambition levels"⁴² for missions abroad have to be planned for NATO Article 5 operations on the level of a deployable brigade with its all support elements.

Two battalion size elements of the brigade⁴³ have to be available for peace operations with an A-B-C system of rotation with two aircraft pairs and four combat helicopters deployable for air-to-ground missions. Air surveillance has to be carried through the command system in place, as well as the three dimensional radar systems, fighter aircraft and combat support units. Host nation support can entail the use of air bases, bridge construction and NBC troops, military hospitals, logistics and support units.

Border security duties have to be carried out with the deployment of a brigade command post, a battalion-size combat group, combat helicopters, artillery and air-defense missile units. Medical, Civil Military Capability (CIMIC), special operations forces, a bridge building battalion, a water purification company and a military police battalion are also needed for special tasks.⁴⁴

In accordance with this, the number of MoD personnel and its background institutions has to be reduced. The remaining ones could be located at fewer sites. The ratio of professional soldiers, civil and public servants has to also be rationalized. Resources of military intelligence agencies also have to be cut down. Additionally, the guard and security tasks around central military installations have to be outsourced.

The financial and procurement system has to be transformed and "privileged" institutions must close down. The force structure has to be tailored to the ambition levels set by the political leadership. Capabilities that cannot be used abroad have to be curtailed.

The land forces would be comprised of:

- • two light infantry brigades, seven light infantry battalions
- • one engineer brigade with bridging, construction, water purification and combat engineer capabilities
- • one ranger type special operations battalion
- • one reconnaissance battalion, of which one company is for long-range reconnaissance tasks
- • one tank battalion
- • one NBC battalion
- • one logistic regiment
- • one training center
- • one maneuver training center
- • one mobile signal company
- • and one Head Quarters support company for the Army Command

The Air Force would be comprised of:

- • two main operational bases, of which one can host all Hungarian fixed wing assets, fourteen Gripens, transport aircraft, and primary training aircraft The second one should be a reserve base, and prepared for Host Nation Support.
- • one helicopter base where all rotary assets are concentrated
- • one air defense missile brigade (KUB and MISTRAL)
- • one surveillance regiment

CRITERION FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT

1. A ten-year plan needs to be developed to this end. To achieve the objectives of the Defense Review the transformation would be expeditiously carried out in accordance with the following timetable:

I. 2004-2006

- transition to a professional force
- supply with necessary equipment
- ensure readiness of assigned forces

II. 2007-2010

- professional training
- establish new capabilities

III. 2011-2013

- achieve required level of interoperability.
2. The 2004-2006 budget should be redrafted.
 3. Provision for full volunteer HDF by 2005 (to achieve the level of readiness by the end of this year which would enable the politicians to fix a date for the abolishment of the conscript service).
 4. To have nine NATO compatible, trained and fully manned battalions by 2006, which are provided with modern equipment and can be flexibly deployed.
 5. Agreement with the local governments to assume responsibility for empty military properties.
 6. To join the new planning cycle of NATO from 2004.
 7. Make necessary amendments to the law by the Parliament.

CONCLUSION

In the world at large, the last few years have seen an increased concern with the so-called “new threats to security.” The positive interstate climate previously described has contributed to the view that the world does not face traditional threats to security and defense and should therefore focus on new ones. That may have the effect of significantly expanding the concept of security and, at the same time, making it much fuzzier.

Not only the American people, but also the whole world remembers the brutal terrorist attack, of September 11, which hit New York and Washington but were aimed against the civilized world. On this occasion the international community should draw the lessons of the tragedy. The first is that international terrorism is one of the most dangerous challenges the world faces. The second is that only a worldwide coalition can successfully combat global terrorism. The third is that the answer should be much broader and complex than applying military power alone. The international community has to cut the financial resources of the terrorist groups and discourage any state to provide a safe harbor for them. And last but not least, the international community should combat the hotbeds of terrorism, such as poverty, extremist views, hatred, dictatorial régimes and promote economic development, democracy and the rule of law.

NATO has moved a long way since September 11 to be able to contribute effectively to the war on terror. Nevertheless, many issues related to this war remain controversial and achieving consensus on concrete actions may prove difficult. Indeed, in many ways, the situation today concerning NATO's role in the war on terror is akin to that in 1994 or the first half of 1995 when it took on out-of-area missions in the former Yugoslavia.

NATO should be the major pillar and the pre-eminent security organization for a 21st century Europe. NATO continues to be the most significant factor of European stability and it will remain the sole organization in the foreseeable future that can provide military guarantees for the security of its members. The experience of the first four years that have passed since the admission of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, has clearly proven the legitimacy and relevance of NATO's eastward enlargement.

A modern, European Hungary needs a well-functioning, up-to-date professional military force. There are two fundamental objectives laid down in the government's program: the fulfillment of national and alliance obligations, and the transition to the all-voluntary defense forces. As a result of the Defense Review, that lasted nearly a year, the government has decided last year to begin to build a voluntary, well-trained and well-equipped Defense Force that meets the contemporary challenges and the requirements of the international environment, and which is transparent and openly financed.

The Defense Review marked Hungary's serious effort to develop a military force that radiates its security without burdening the country and that performs its tasks professionally both within the country and within the alliance. The Defense Review, among other things has pointed out the importance of creating new capabilities and the possibilities for their use and development.

Hungary needs gradually to enter into service up-to-date military technical equipment to achieve a higher level of interoperability with the Defense Forces of the Alliance. Several significant development programs have been launched to create the capabilities. However, up-to-date and regularly improved knowledge is also needed to operate the modern equipment.

The motion on the development of the Defense Forces put forward to the Parliament contains a program for a ten-year period. Through the consistent and predictable execution of the tasks formulated in the motion, a voluntary-based defense forces complying with the altered security policy circumstances will be created. The fact that the defense budget increased to an extent exceeding the NATO average is greatly appreciated within the alliance. But reform is not only about money. Ultimately, it's about political leadership. It takes political will, devotion, and clarity of leadership from the government to achieve successful military reform. Hungary can put

huge sums of money into military reform, but in the absence of a good concept, political will and political leadership, the process is always going to fail.

Hungary is going to build smaller, more effective, more mobile and more communicative Defense Forces, which are better able to serve both Hungarian and NATO interests. With the ongoing reform of Hungarian Defense Forces, Hungary will better contribute to the renewal of the Alliance and its defense capabilities and will win back her lost credibility.

WORD COUNT= 6,333

ENDNOTES

¹ In the wake of Srebrenica, in which as many as 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys were summarily executed by Bosnian Serb forces, international attitudes against the Bosnian Serbs hardened. Within two month of the massacre, NATO had carried out its first air campaign, leading to the signing of a peace agreement to and more than three-and-a-half years of fighting. By December of that same year, NATO was leading a peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and providing the security for a peace process to take root.

² NATO's Response to Terrorism, Statement issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 6 December 2001. Available from <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-159e.htm>>; Internet; accessed 9 October 2003.

³ The process of enlargement of the European Union was launched on 30 March 1998. As decided by the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002. As of May 1, 2004, the EU has ten new members: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.

And see: EU enlargement. Available from <http://europe.eu.int/comm/enlargement/index_en.html>; Internet; accessed 12 January 2004.

⁴ The Alliance's Strategic Concept of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999 Ch; 39. Available from < <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> >; Internet; accessed 12 October 2003.

And see: NATO after Prague Available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/0211prague/after_prague.pdf>; Internet; accessed 25 November 2003.

⁵ Integration meant that Hungary wanted to belong to a community of values, such as freedom, independence, national sovereignty, democracy, individual responsibility, respect for human and minority rights, private enterprise, and so on.

⁶ John D. Banusiewicz. Rumsfeld: NATO Evolving to Meet 21st Century Threats. Available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2003/n11302003_200311302.html; Internet; accessed 9 February 2004.

⁷ NATO's Response to Terrorism. Statement issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the NAC held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 6 December 2001. Available from <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-159e.htm>>; Internet; accessed 9 October 2003>.

⁸ In fact, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán was the first allied leader to call for NATO's collective defense response on September 11.

⁹ John D. Banusiewicz. Rumsfeld Praises NATO's Transformation, Progress. American Forces Press Service. Available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2003/n12012003_200312017.html>; Internet; accessed 15 February 2004.

And see; NATO Review, Change and continuity. Available from <<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue4/english/art1.htm>>; Internet; accessed 9 October 2003.

¹⁰ Bernard Jenkin. The War Against Terrorism, The EU's Response, and the Future of NATO. Available from <<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/HL735.cfm>>; Internet; accessed 9 October 2003.

¹¹ NATO's Response to Terrorism. Available from <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-159e.htm>>; Internet; accessed 9 October 2003.

¹² As Secretary General Lord Robertson put it after the Prague summit: "in 2002, we left behind the debate whether NATO could or should act outside its territory."

¹³ In this context, anti-terrorism means defensive measures to reduce vulnerability, including limited response and containment actions by military forces and such activities as assuring threat warnings, maintaining the effectiveness of the integrated air defense system and providing missile defense. Consequence management means post-attack recuperation and involves such elements as contributing planning and force generation, providing capabilities for immediate assistance, providing coordination centers, and establishing training capabilities. Counter-terrorism means the use of offensive measures, including counter-force activities, both with NATO in the lead and with NATO in support of other organizations or coalitions involving Allies. And military cooperation covers among other things cooperation with Russia, Ukraine, Partners, Mediterranean Dialogue countries and other countries, as well as with other organizations, including the EU, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the United Nations (UN).

¹⁴ NATO after Prague. Available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/0211prague/after_prague.pdf>; Internet; accessed 9 January 2004.

¹⁵ It includes the following eight fields: chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defense; intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition; air-to-ground surveillance; command, control and communications; combat effectiveness, including precision-guided munitions and suppression of enemy air defenses; strategic air and sea lift; air-to-air refueling; and deployable combat support and combat service support units.

¹⁶ Kathleen T. Rhem. NATO Countries Need to "Generate More Usable Soldiers." Available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2003/n10092003_200310091.html>; Internet; accessed 19 November 2003.

¹⁷ John C. Hulsman. A Grand Bargain with Europe: Preserving NATO for the 21st Century. Available from <<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/BG1360.cfm>> Internet; accessed 5 February 2004.

¹⁸ NATO Enlargement. Available from <<http://www.nato.int/issues/enlargement/index.htm>>; Internet; accessed 12 February 2004.

¹⁹ Good relations could create a stable environment and favorable atmosphere for democratization and economic development of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and for further enlargement of the Alliance.

And see: NATO's Response to Terrorism, Statement issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 6 December 2001.

Available from <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-159e.htm>>; Internet; accessed 9 October 2003.

²⁰ Hungarian Defense Forces (1999). Available from <<http://www.un.int/hungary/hdefforc.htm>>; Internet; accessed 18 October 2003.

²¹ John C. Hulsman. A Grand Bargain with Europe: Preserving NATO for the 21st Century. Executive Memorandum #643. Available from <<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/EM643.cfm>>; Internet; accessed 11 February 2004.

²² Magyar Honvéd. A védelmi felülvizsgálat után (1.). Zrinyi Kiado, Budapest; September 22, 2003.

²³ To maintain a separate force for each task is not only financially irrational but leads to underemployment in the majority of the military organizations and endangers the morale of the troops.

²⁴ e.g. indirect fire support and target acquisition equipment applicable day and night in all weather conditions, short range air defense, observation/intelligence, combat and support helicopters, maintenance, supply, transportation, repair and recovery units, medical assets

²⁵ e.g. artillery, intelligence, or antitank capability

²⁶ with four aero planes or helicopters each

²⁷ Military Observers, and Peace-keepers, in 5 Missions.

²⁸ Military Observers, and Advisers, in 4 Missions.

²⁹ Multinational Forces and Observers

³⁰ U.S. Central Command

³¹ International Security Assistance Force

³² Stabilization Forces in Iraq

³³ As to the locations, Hungarian soldiers can be found, among others, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tampa, Sarajevo, and Western Sahara, Cyprus, on the Sinai Peninsula, in Iraq, Tirana, Skopje, Kosovo, Kabul, Veliko Kladusa, Macedonia and Georgia. The geopolitical position of Hungary and the continuous, and often violent changes, that have taken place in the Balkans since the end of the Cold War, have sharply increased the responsibilities, commitments and burdens for peace operations by the Hungarian Defense Forces.

³⁴ Magyar Honvéd. A védelmi felülvizsgálat után (3.). Zrinyi Kiado, Budapest; October 06, 2003.

³⁵ Exceeding HUF 67 billion in 2004 after the HUF 53 billion budget last year, while in 2010 the Ministry of Defense may allocate over HUF 100 billion for the development of military technology, calculated in current prices.

³⁶ The first company of the battalion had been offered to the staff of the NRF - which is a rapidly deployable special force - as of 1st January 2001.

³⁷ This might occur for example on a NATO mission when it would be tasked with preparing the local police and the regular forces.

³⁸ All other deployments abroad (EU, UN) must depend on the two-third-majority decision of the Parliament. In line with the constitution, the special operational battalion would be capable of being deployed inside Hungary in case an emergency situation is announced. (For instance, upon a large-scale terror attack).

³⁹ Magyar Honvéd. A védelmi felülvizsgálat után (2.). Zrinyi Kiado, Budapest; September 22, 2003.

⁴⁰ Cabinet Proposal on Hungarian Army Transformation Until 2013. Available from <<http://www.empa.hu/cikk/c420.htm>>; Internet; accessed 5 February 2004.

⁴¹ Army Transformation Draft to Go Before Parliament in February. Available from <<http://www.empa.hu/cikk/c401.htm>>; Internet; accessed 5 February 2004.

⁴² Ambition levels: are specified for missions both at home and abroad, which, in turn provided the fundamental basis for the depth and the orientation of the transformation.

⁴³ A maximum of 1600 troops.

⁴⁴ The latter one to be deployed for a period of six months without rotation.

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